

## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SECRET

July 16, 1959

TO: U - Mr. Dillon  
FROM: EUR - Mr. Kohler *ma*  
SUBJECT: Comments on CAHTO 148, July 16, for  
Conference with the President and Mr.  
McElroy.


The principal problem which arises relates to numbered paragraph 3.

This paragraph is unclear though the implication is left that no distinction is made between Russian purpose of securing erosion or liquidation of our rights after the expiration of time limit and our purpose of preserving those rights unimpaired. The telegrams seems to assume that the negotiation involves a question of what the extent of the time period should be, i.e., one year or a year and a half as proposed by the Soviets or two and a half years as proposed by us in the context of our original peace plan or some other agreed time period.

In subsequent unnumbered paragraph ~~if~~ ref tel says "we have made language of this paper to conform almost identically with wording our offer of June 16". A copy of this paper is attached for ready reference. Ref tel then says that "both our allies and we convinced no occupational rights forfeited nor any sacrifice of principle" would result from the use of this language. Presumably the reference applies to paragraph 1(b) of the June 16 proposal which, again presumably, must have been adapted as a definition of the access rights to be preserved after the expiration of the time limit. However, we have no revised text from which to judge whether language constitutes an explicit preservation of our rights.

The penultimate paragraph of ref tel relates to Berlin troop levels. The procedure suggested is probably satisfactory as a negotiating tactic. In this connection, however, we are informed (though we have not yet seen

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*can be*  
*8-469* EUR: F. D. Kohler



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a final copy) that a JCS study indicates that any substantial reduction of the present troop level as proposed by the Soviets and apparently seriously considered in Geneva would in fact make Berlin highly vulnerable to taking over by civil disturbance, penetration, and the like. Depending on the nature of your discussions tomorrow we are of course ready to work out with Defense a considered reply to refuel.

cc: *Frank &  
disturbed  
7/29/59*

EUR:FDKohler:sj

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